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Abstract 
The lament that Russia is at the mercy of powerful personalities contesting for the 
reigns of power may be accurate. But here we want to find a way out of this condition. 
We begin by noting that more than mere lip-service needs to be paid to the idea that 
the two dimensions of reform - economic and political - are fused and that one cannot 
be attacked without attacking the other. Just as economic policies are manipulated in 
accordance with the principle that socially desirable outcomes cannot be willed or wished 
into existence - they derive, if at all, from the ways in which government action and the 
structure of economic institutions channel individual self-interest - the same must be true 
of political reform. Tracing the interests established by Russia's current constitutional 
order with respect to representation and elections, though, we conclude that that order 
and those interests almost certainly preordain executive-legislative conflict. Focusing, 
then, on those things that can be changed without constitutional amendment, we suggest 
a set of electoral reforms that promise to aleviate at least this problem and that allow 
for presidential leadership rather than the mere administration of authority and power. 
INSTITUTIONS AND INCENTIVES: THE 
PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY1 
Peter C. Ordeshook 
Can Russia become a stable democracy, protective of individual rights? Are there ways to end 
the conflicts that seem a permanent f ea tu re of her politics? Will the new constitution bring order to 
presidential-legislative relations and to the process of making law? Is Russia destined to repeat its 
historical experience with political reform, to be driven again into the arms of authoritarian rule and 
possibly even dismemberment? 
Presently, pessimistic answers to all of these questions seem more viable than optimistic ones. 
Democratic reformers scurry about in disarray, stunned by their dismal performance in the December 
1993 parliamentary elections, while nationalists and fascists marshall their forces so as to seize power 
through Russia's infant democratic institutions. Political maneuver continues to be characterize by 
minimal adherence to the law, and even otherwise staunch def enders of democracy are willing to 
resort to undemocratic actions when it serves their purposes. No longer are people concerned with 
lofty Marxist or Democratic ideals: Their primary concern is mere survival, while those in a position 
to do so act to strip the society of whatever they can to ensure their own prosperity. Anarchy in day­
to-day business ventures is tempered only by mafia clans, whose ability to enforce contracts is 
unchallenged by the state. And with plummeting industrial production and portents of soaring 
- unemployment as backdrops for ever-increasing demands for subsidies to inefficient agriculture and 
industry, comparisons with Weimar Germany do not stretch the bounds of credulity. 
When looking, then, at the outcome of the December elections it would seem that we should not 
ask why democratic reformers fared so poorly and why a fascist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, fared so well, 
but why reformers received as many votes as they did and why fascists, extreme nationalists, or those 
who simply prefer to halt reform failed to secure outright control of the parliament.2 
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Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on Economic Reform, 
Moscow, May 1994, sponsored by the University of Maryland's IRIS Center in collaboration 
with the Institute for Economic Transition, and at the Summer Training Workshop, Toronto, 
June 1994, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the Center for Russian and 
East European Studies of the University of Toronto. 
If we look only at those seats in the Duma (lower legislativ� chamber) filled by national party­
list proportional representation, Zhirinovsky's party, in combination with the Communists and 
It serves little purpose, though, to compile lists of problems that confront Russia (and the other 
successor states of the USSR). Instead, we should ask whether these states are trapped in some terrible 
equilibrium that can be escaped only by greater and more dangerous political turmoil and by a retreat 
from the principles of liberal democracy. In this essay, we want to find a way out of this condition -
- reforms or a perspective on reform that leads to more optimistic answers to our initial questions. 
We begin by noting the schizophrenia about reform that is common to most ex-Soviet states, 
Russia in particular. Reform has two dimensions -- an economic one and a political one. And 
although lip-service is paid to the proposition that these two dimensions are fused and that one cannot 
be attacked without attacking the other, they are approached as though different principles guide 
each. In fact, the same basic principle ought to direct our confrontation of both. 
The strategies of the economic reformer are stated in terms of laws on private property, banking, 
and contracts, and take the form of government policies on tariffs, taxes, privatization, borrowing, 
and subsidies. Regardless of the "school of thought" to which a reformer adheres, it is understood that 
these laws and policies need to be manipulated in accordance with a common principle -- that socially 
desirable outcomes cannot be willed or wished into existence; they derive, if at all, from the ways in 
which government action and the structure of economic institutions channel individual self-interest. 
People cannot be made to work, save, invest, or invent through mere hortatory. As with Adam 
Smith's invisible hand, people must be given the incentives to do these things in natural and self­
sustaining ways. Thus, by manipulating government policies and by nurturing the development of 
appropriate economic institutions and processes, reform must make working, saving, investing, and 
inventing in people's immediate self-interest. 
Although the ways in which the principle of self-interest is best app1ied in economics to achieve 
certain ends are only imperfectly understood, its applicability with respect to the second dimension 
of reform, the political one, is even less well appreciated. But appreciated or not, the transition to 
democracy also consists of the design and manipulation of institutions -- in this instance, of schemes 
of legislative representation, election laws, and constitutional allocations of power -- that render 
certain types of actions and the pursuit of certain classes of outcomes in people's self-interest. And 
if a democracy is to be stable, then those institutions must be crafted so that they occasion the 
incentive among people with the power to abolish those institutions, to refrain from doing so. 
Americans looking for applications of this principle of self-interest need look no further than the 
crafting of their own constitution. Although the circumstances they confronted were profoundly 
Agrarians, secured 43% of the vote whereas the reformist parties Russia's Choice, Yabloko 
(Yavlinski), Democratic Reform (which failed to surpass the 5% threshold) and Russian Unity 
- and Concord received 34%. 
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different from those of present-day Russia, the parallelism of economic and political reform was well 
understood by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. For example, when debating the method whereby 
judges ought to be selected, Benjamin Franklin sought to inspire a fuller consideration of the 
alternatives among the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention by relating a Scottish method "in 
which the nomination proceeded from the lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession 
in order to get rid of him and share his practice among themselves." Applied to the protections 
democracy provides against tyranny, James Madison generalized the principle Franklin illustrated 
when he wrote: "the great security against the gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and the personal motives to resist encroachments of the others ... Ambition must be made to 
counter ambition" (Federalist, no. 51, emphasis added). 
It is this principle that Russia has not yet applied with any great consistency in its approach to 
political reform. Perhaps we should not be surprised. The discovered laws of economics that derive 
from the principle of self-interest -- the laws of supply and demand, of rational expectations, of 
market efficiency and of market failure -- compel us to a daily appreciation of their relevance in the 
economic activities of the individual and the state. In addition, the comparative prosperity of  "the 
West" forced an understanding of the imperatives of the principle of self-interest and those laws not 
only on the elites within the Soviet orbit, but on the population in general. Unfortunately, fewer such 
laws have revealed themselves in politics. Economic errors allow for continuous refinement and 
adaptation of policies and theory, whereas political ones often are revealed too late or in too complex 
a circumstance to allow for learning and correction. 
This fact, coupled with the baggage of a past that denied the universal relevance of the principle 
of self-interest and the ideals of liberal democracy, yields a circumstance in which political reform 
is not always viewed from the same perspectives as economic reform. It is viewed instead through 
the old lens of command and control -- of the need to manipulate the traditional means of exercising 
control through crude instruments of power and allocations of authority. Rather than pay heed to the 
complex (and imperfectly understood) ways in which democratic institutions shape incentives and 
sustain themselves, it is only the outer shell of those institutions that are manipulated. And with 
people's perceptions of the future obscuring by the uncertainties of transition, and with those in 
power sharing an understandable reluctance to relinquish their authority, those manipulations are 
motivated less by a search for a stable democratic order than they are by the singular goal of securing 
immediate political advantage. 
The common lament in Russia that all politics are the politics of personalities and power may be 
an apt summary of the current situation. But we need to understand that this situation is itself less 
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a cause of anything than it is a manifestation of the failure to appreciate that the basic principle of 
political reform is identical to that of economic reform. Describing the situation thus and searching 
for a cadre of new, more enlightened leaders, can only yield disappointment and cannot contribute 
to the task of ensuring a democratic Russia. If the principle of self-interest is universally valid, then 
the actions of any new cadre of political elites will be dictated by the same incentives that guide the 
actions of the current ones. It is as though the solution to market failure were assumed to be the 
replacement of one set of CEO's with another set. This assumption is silly in economics, and it is 
equally silly in politics. Once again, Madison summarizes the matter: "If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary ... In framing a government which is to be administered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself (Federalist, no. 5 1). 
Meaningful political reform, then, requires that we look to those things that determine incentives, 
especially of those who hold the coercive reigns of government in their hands. And indeed, it is the 
failure to do these things carefully that now bedevils Russia's transition to democracy. Specifically, 
this failure is revealed in at least these three ways: 
• the way in which the new Russian constitution tries to shape presidential-legislative 
relations; 
• in the general approach to federalism and the way in which Moscow tries to meet the 
demands for regional autonomy; and 
• in the failure to understand the determinants of political party structures, the role of 
parties in facilitating the resolution of political conflict, and the relationship between 
parties and interest groups. 
2. Executive-Legislative Relations
As written, the new Russian constitution, ratified by popular referendum at the same time as the
1993 parliamentary election, gives every indication of extending the conflict between president and 
parliament that precipitated Yeltsin's coup against the old parliament. Parliament legislates but the 
president can also make law (by decree insofar as the law is silent); the president can veto acts of 
parliament, but the parliament can veto decrees (by passing contrary laws and, if necessary, by 
overriding presidential vetoes of those laws); and the president can hire and fire ministers, whereas 
the parliament can vote no confidence in the government and compel the president to choose between 
replacing his ministers and scheduling new parliamentary elections. Thus, the new constitution 
adheres to only the most superficial notion of a separation of powers, and, aside from those special 
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powers that give the president the upper hand in any dispute (to dismiss parliament, to call referenda, 
to suspend local acts and laws, and to interpret the constitution in his role as "protector of the 
constitution"), it places the president and parliament in direct opposition to each other. In a state 
with strong democratic traditions, such institutional entanglements might compel compromise, as 
when President Mitterand and Prime Minister Chirac resolved the problem of cohabitation, or when 
executive and legislative branches of a government allow the third branch, the court, to resolve 
disputes between them.3 But the likelihood of compromise depends not only on necessity, but also 
on the incentives to do so. That is, the likelihood that Russia will choose the compromises that 
characterize stable democracies versus the conflicts and instability that characterize an unstable one 
depends largely on whether political elites believe that their individual objectives are best served by 
compromise or by conflict. 
In attempting to trace the incentives of any president and deputies to parliament, it is not 
unreasonable to begin with the assumption that, whether patriotic of venal, the goals of political elites 
can be expressed in terms of the quest for power and for the authority to manipulate governmental 
policy and outcomes. But regardless of the ultimate ends to which power and authority are to be 
directed, we should also assume that, insofar as the Russian constitution outlines the rules under 
which they must operate (otherwise, a discussion of the prospects for democracy is mute), the ability 
of people to achieve these ends will depend on the likelihood that they can secure the support of those 
who would directly or indirectly confirm their appointment to public office -- the people. It is this 
relationship that determines the fates of those who fill these offices in a constitutional democracy, 
and it is this relationship that determines the consequences for those elites of alternative compromises 
as well as the failure to compromise. Unfortunately, it is here that those Russians who have filled 
in the details of the relationship between public office-holders and the people by law, decree or 
constitutional provision, have undermined the prospects for compromise and democratic stability. 
Although the rules for presidential selection are not yet set in statutory concrete, it is almost 
certain that the next president will be directly elected using a simple majority-with-runoff procedure. 
That is, if no one receives a majority of the vote on the first ballot, a runoff election will be 
conducted between the two strongest candidates, and the winner of that contest will become Russia's 
next president. We have no quarrel with direct presidential elections (although later we argue against 
this specific implementation of that idea). We do want to emphasize, though, that if  Yeltsin could 
successfully claim a national mandate on the basis of questionable referenda, then a new president, 
3 See, for example, the discussion in Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and
Assemblies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
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directly elected and guaranteed a majority vote on either the first or second ballot, will be able to 
claim the same mandate on an even firmer footing. Indeed, requiring that the eventual winner secure 
a majority of the votes cast at some point in the process (as opposed to, say, electing the simple 
plurality winner) is intended to ensure a mandate. 
Mandates are valuable commodities for anyone choosing to exert presidential leadership and it is 
imperative that, given his constitutional powers, he be given the opportunity to lead. But set in the 
context of the constitutional powers of the president versus parliament and combined with the specific 
method Russians have chosen for electing deputies to the Duma (lower legislative chamber), we find 
that direct election of president implements a constitutional system that virtually guarantees 
executive-legislative deadlock. 
The problem here originates not with direct election of the president, but with the electoral system 
used for the Duma elections. The next Duma election, scheduled for December 1995, six months 
prior to the next presidential election in June 1996, will most likely use the same procedure as was 
used for electing the first Duma -- half in single member constituencies and half by national party­
list proportional representation. This procedure was implemented to facilitate the formation of 
national parties and the ensure against the election of those opponents of reform that could marshall 
strong local electoral support. What was forgotten, though, were the incentives among deputies that 
party list P R  establishes and how those incentives might engender conflict with any president, 
reformist or otherwise. Specifically, with candidates for the Duma competing through national party 
lists, and with parliamentary elections occurring before and independent of  the presidential contest, 
any majority coalition within the Duma can assert the same mandate claimed by the president -- a 
mandate that Zhirinovsky claimed with only 23 percent of the vote and which someone with any 
larger percentage is certain to argue is his. 
Thus, with both the president and one or more parties in parliament claiming the same thing -­
possession of a mandate to lead -- and with the new constitution confusing the issue of "who is in 
charge," the stage is set for conflict and crisis of precisely the same sort that characterize the early 
stages of Russian democracy. 
Stable democracies avoid the potential for conflict Russia has built into its constitutional order in 
one of two ways. In presidential systems like the U.S., individual legislators typically are elected from 
narrowly drawn constituencies. Despite proclamations that legislators ought to represent the interests 
of the entire country (which they do whenever there is a near-consensus on matters and, thus, 
whenever the meaning of "national interest" is clear), this structure of representation dilutes the 
legislature's claim to a national mandate and give individual legislators a primary interest in satisfying 
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their more narrowly defined constituencies.4 Even if the legislature is controlled by a party other 
than the president's, a president who claims a national mandate need not find himself in opposition 
to the legislature. Compromises can be reached through the simple expedient of linking the 
president's national policy objectives to the specific interests of local constituencies through the 
processes of logrolling and vote trading that characterize the give and take of democratic politics. 5 
Parliamentary systems take a different approach. Regardless of the way in which parliament is 
elected, and regardless of what mandate parties may or may not claim, the president's powers (more 
generally, the chief of state, since we should not exclude constitutional monarchies from the 
discussion) are weakened and the executive branch is, by definition, made the creature of parliament. 
Thus, the authority to lead rests with the government as sanctioned by parliament. The government 
(prime minister) can claim a mandate, but only to the extent that it enjoys the support of parliament. 
And although a directly elected chief of state can also claim a mandate when, for instance, 
emergencies arise, conflict is avoided by a diminution of this office's ability to interfere in general 
executive and legislative functions. 
This is neither the time nor the place to argue which of these two governmental forms is best for 
Russia. Some commentators argue that Russia's political traditions and contemporary circumstances 
require the strong, unitary leadership most compatible with a presidential system. Others argue that 
the potential for executive-legislative stalemate requires the fusion of executive and legislative 
branches that define a parliamentary system. However, Russia has adopted neither of these forms, 
or more confusingly, it has adopted both simultaneously. The powers of the presidency there are 
indeed exceptional, whereas the parliament, in addition to its normal legislative law-making function, 
is given control over whether the existing constitution should be treated as a transitional document, 
as well as the rules that govern the president's powers in an emergency, his authority to call referenda, 
and some control over the government itself.6 Thus, it has instead adopted a political structure that 
4 
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The clearest expositions of this view are offered in David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral
Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974; and Morris P. Fiorina, Congress:
Keystone of the Washington Establishment, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 
See, for example, John A. Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics, Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 1974. 
To potential for treating the new constitution as a transitional document is provided for in 
Articles 135 and 136, which specify procedures for amending the document. Article 136 
describes a difficult process for amending the main body of the document that parallels the 
American procedure (approval of two thirds of the lower chamber, three fourths of the upper 
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closely parallels the one employed in Weimar Germany, with all of the dangers that that that structure 
portends.7
2. Federal Relations
Aside from the conflict between the President and the Congress that characterized the first years 
of Russian democracy, no issue was of greater concern than that of federalism, especially the 
relationship of Russia's ethnic republics to Moscow. Who was to control Russia's vast natural 
resources, and who was to oversee the privatization of state property? Were the ethnic republic 
sovereign, could they conduct their own foreign policy, and could they secede from the Federation? 
What power did Moscow have over even the existence of regional Soviets that were the legislatures 
of Russia's federal subjects? Whose laws were supreme, and in what domains? Could regional 
governments be compelled to forward any portion of their tax revenues to Moscow? Should Russia's 
ethnic republics, which had historically enjoyed greater autonomy that the other parts of the 
Federation, be treated differently that those other parts? 
We do not want to make judgements about the form of federalism Russia should choose. Instead, 
we merely want to make three observations about the constitutional bargain that was ultimately 
established during the constitutional debate. The first is that formal negotiations over this 
relationship with respect to Russia's ethnic republics focused on a Federal Treaty that consisted 
primarily of an enumeration of jurisdictions that belonged exclusively to Moscow (e.g., printing 
money, national defense) and jurisdictions to be shared by Moscow and the republic governments 
(e.g., regulation of the environment, administration of social welfare programs). Second, and as part 
of this negotiation, republics demanded that they be identified as "sovereign states," with the 
presumption that this label, combined with the terms of the Federal Treaty, would protect their 
autonomous rights. Finally, republics demanded that they retain the authority to renegotiate 
bilaterally the particulars of their relationship with Moscow, so that separate deals could be struck 
between regional and national governments over the disposition of joint jurisdictions. 
7 
one, and two thirds of all federal subjects). Article 135, though, allows parliament, three 
fifths in each chamber to call for a new Constituent Assembly that can approve of its own 
creation either with a two thirds vote or by securing its approval popular referendum. 
To assess the relevance of the Weimar case see especially Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy, Translated from German by Ellen Kennedy, Cambridge (Mass.): 
- MIT Press, 1985. 
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These observations occasion several questions about the extent to which an understanding of 
incentives played any role in the negotiations over Russia's federal form. First, was any mechanism 
envisioned for enforcing an agreement? Second, was any process identified for resolving the 
ambiguities inherent in a treaty that encompassed virtually all activities and responsibilities of the 
state? Finally, what consequences were envisioned for the creation of an asymmetric federation that 
treated republics differently than the predominantly Russian oblasts and krais? 
In fact, little attention was paid to the institutional determinants of incentives, and little thought 
given to answering these questions. Instead, with eyes focused on political expediency, Yeltsin's first 
draft constitution, offered in April 1993 when the resolution of his conflict with the People's 
Congress remained in doubt, identified republics as sovereign entities, provided them with the 
authority to negotiate their relationship with Moscow on a bilateral basis, and, in a provision that 
could hardly be taken seriously by anyone interested in a system of balanced powers (keep in mind 
that the republics account for only fifteen percent of Russia's population), required that the 
representation of the republics in the upper legislative chamber, the Federation Council, be increased 
to whatever extent necessary to ensure their control of that chamber. All of these special provisions 
were dropped in the final version once Yeltsin no longer need the republics in his struggle against the 
Congress. 
The final version of the constitution adhered to the idea of enumer_ated powers, and incorporated 
the long lists of exclusive and joint jurisdictions that were the core of the Federal Treaty (Articles 
7 1  and 72). Whatever protection the constitution provides for federal subjects is contained in the 
structure and powers of the upper legislative chamber, the Federation Council. Briefly, the Council 
is much like the US_ Senate in form and function. With two deputies selected from each of Russia's 
89 oblasts, krais, republics, and so on, the Council approves of any internal changes in borders, 
regulates the president's emergency powers, approves of the use of troops abroad and declarations of 
war, convict the president following impeachment by the Duma, and approves presidential 
nominations to the Constitutional Court. There are, though, two exceptions to the parallelism between 
the Council and U.S. Senate. The first is the Duma's ability to override (with a two thirds vote) a 
refusal by the Federation Council to approve of any law (Article 105). The second exception, which 
can be interpreted generously as a twist on the original provision of the U.S. Constitution that state 
legislatures determine the means of their state's representation in the Senate, is a vaguely worded 
requirement (Articles 95 and 96) that the Federation Council be "formed" from the executive and 
legislative branches of federal subjects. Although compatible with the idea that the chief executive 
(governor) and chief legislative officer of each region should be deputies to the Federation Council, 
until Parliament passes a constitutional law that provides details about the method of selection, the 
President can use his decree authority to establish any method he prefers. 
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The undifferentiated treatment of republics and other regions of the Federation suggests that 
Russia has opted for a symmetric federalism in which the autonomy--and prerogatives of federal 
subjects are protected by their representation in an upper legislative chamber. But once again, 
because of the failure to consider incentives, on closer inspection we find no such guarantee. 
That no such guarantee exists can be seen by examining the indirect as well as the direct 
mechanisms whereby states in the U.S. ensure their autonomy against the powers of the national 
government.8 Although that autonomy has been considerably eroded over two hundred years 
through increasingly liberal interpretations of constitutional commerce and equal protection 
provisions, states continue to enjoy a good deal more autonomy than is possessed by federal subjects 
of most other "federalisms." In fact, the use to which the commerce and equal protection provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution have been put demonstrates our ability to interpret and reinterpret 
constitutional clauses in ways that justify nearly anything with respect to the allocation of 
jurisdictions and responsibilities. And the American Civil War demonstrates that as long as the 
national government enjoys the support of the military, then in principle, states remain at the mercy 
of that government. 
Thus, we must look beyond constitutional enumerations of jurisdictions and guarantees of 
autonomy in answering the question "what protects state autonomy?" We must look instead at the 
incentives of those who have the authority to change or reinterpret a constitution or to simply 
override its provisions through force. 
In the case of the United States, the answer to our question lies not in any enumeration of powers. 
It lies elsewhere in the constitution -- in the requirement that individual states control the election 
of the members of both branches of Congress that represent them and their residents. This 
requirement does a simple thing: it ensures that political parties in the U.S., although operating under 
only the two labels Democrat and Republican, are primarily state and local organizations. Thus, the 
U.S. does not have two parties: it has at least a hundred of them -- fifty Democratic and fifty 
Republican ones. We can even argue that it has thousands to the extent that state parties are merely 
collections of local ones that cooperate to compete in state-wide or district-wide elections, and that 
organize on a national basis every four years to nominate and elect a president. 
Thus, although it is the competition for the office of the presidency that dictates an equilibrium 
of two national coalitions and labels, it is a highly decentralized and localized party system that 
oversees the reelection prospects of individual members of the Senate and House of Representatives. 
8 Our discussion here of the American case largely follows William H. Riker, Federalism,
Boston: Little Brown, 1964. 
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A president may influence events at the margin by influencing public sentiment with respect to which 
party can take credit or receive blame for the state of the economy or which party is associated with 
the most recent foreign policy success or failure, but as more than one legislator has expressed the 
matter, in the U.S. at least, "all politics are local." 
With their political fortunes tied to local constituencies and party organizations, national legislators 
have an incentive, insofar as it matches the incentives of their constituencies, to resist the 
encroachments of national governmental power. Much of what legislators do in their representative 
roles is to balance national policy objectives against the authority of state and local governments. 
Legislative majorities that resist such encroachments, in turn, are supported by an incentive to protect 
the autonomy of each other's constituency since the protection of one is the protection of all. 
Insofar as what it is that maintains this structure as an equilibrium -- the constitutional and 
statutory laws that govern legislative representation and election -- we need look no further than 
immediate legislative self-interest. Put simply, legislators have no incentive to change the rules of 
a game in which they are the winners. If changes are made (for example, "reforms" in campaign 
finance laws), they are made largely to benefit incumbent legislators rather than to make elections 
"more democratic." Thus, protection of state and local autonomy is provided by the connection 
between legislators and constituents and the indirect incentives this creates among legislators to 
represent their constituencies; this connection, in turn, is maintained by the unwillingness of 
legislators to change the game they are playing. 
No such equilibrium is promised for Russian. First, because we are uncertain how the next 
president will be elected, we cannot know what role competition for that office will play in 
determining party organizations. Second, the same is true for selection of deputies to the Federation 
Council. Although the first session was filled by direct plurality voting, that procedure was a 
temporary measure dictated by Yeltsin's dissolution of regional Supreme Soviets. It remains an open 
question as to whether popular election will again be used or whether some type of appointment 
process, directed by Moscow or regional governments, will be used. Third, Yeltsin's election decree 
contained within it the framework for a general election law that established a Central Election 
Commission with broad authority to regulate election rules and procedures. Thus, there is no 
guarantee that Russia's regions will play any significant role in determining any important structural 
detail of the electoral process. Finally, we can assume that Russia will continue to employ a system 
in which half of the Duma is elected by party-list PR, thereby wholly undermining any tendency 
toward political party decentralization as well as any incentive on the part of Duma deputies to 
represent and be protective of local and regional autonomy. 
Russia, then, has established a "federal" order that is most compatible with a unitary state. But 
when we combine this fact with the general weakness of the national government, and with the 
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natural incentives for regional governments to refuse to submit their legally mandated share of tax 
receipts to Moscow, to treat federal law a supreme, and to regard state property as belonging to them 
and not anyone else, we have the ingredients for ongoing conflict if not the ultimate dismemberment 
of the Federation. 
3. The Political Party System
A common lament about Russia's transition to democracy is summarized by Yegor Gaidar's
political advisor, Vladimir Mau, when he writes: "Economic interest groups are now the key players 
in Russian politics; political parties, by contrast, have been and remain weak and unstable. In the 
corridors of power, they wield much less influence than associations of managers and 
entrepreneurs."9 This description is accurate. However, it need not be permanent. 
There is nothing special about Russia that dictates political parties of a particular number or type. 
It is true that in an unsettled social and economic climate, the usual political divide between left and 
right or between a preference for an activist state versus a laissez faire one that underlies party 
systems elsewhere is complicated by other issues, such as the nationalist sentiment that derives from 
the sense of lost glory and empire or the sense of regionalism that derives from decades if not 
centuries of indifferent dominance by Moscow. On the other hand, if election laws are �uch that they 
generate incentives for the formation and maintenance of only fragmented weak parties, then those 
laws will operate with added force in a society with incoherent or sharply conflicting interests.10
This is the situation in Russia. 
Three features of Russia's political institutions contribute to the fragmentation and incoherence 
that characterizes parties presently: 
9 
• non-simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections; 
• the likely use of a majority runoff election procedure for the next presidential 
election; and 
"The Assent of the Inflationists," Journal of Democracy, April 1994, pp. 32-35. 
10 There is a large literature on this subject, much of which is summarized in Rein Taagepera
and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, and 
updated with particular attention paid to the interaction between election laws and social 
cleavages by Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District 
Magnitude, and the Number of Parties," American Journal of Political Science, 38, February 
1994, pp. 100-23. 
12 
• the election of half the Duma by party-list proportional representation. 
First, the failure to require simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections stems, at least 
in part, from Yeltsin's apparent desire to fill an office that is somehow "above politics" and day-to­
day administrative matters. But while this attitude may match the aspirations of an unelected Czar, 
disallowing simultaneous elections denies a president the opportunity to carry a workable legislative 
majority with him as a product of his personal appeal and campaign strategy. And when reenforced 
by an unwillingness to associate with any specific party, nonsimultaneous elections undermine the 
ability of presidential elections to become a focus for the formation of parties generally. 
Second, the use of a majority runoff election procedure for the next presidential election derives 
from tradition and, admittedly, from the arrogant belief in Moscow that alternative procedures such 
as preferential voting are beyond the comprehension of Russia's citizens. However, runoffs 
discourage uncompetitive parties from withdrawing in an election, especially those parties led by 
those who believe they can negotiate the party's support in a runoff. Thus, if the incentive is not to 
win but to block others from winning outright so as to trade an endorsement prior to the second ballot 
for ministerial positions or commitments to policy, then runoff elections can only exacerbate the 
problem to which Mau refers. Parties must find a constituency, and thus this procedure encourages 
small parties to act like economic interest groups and it encourages economic interests to act like 
parties. 
Finally, electing half the Duma by party-list PR was intended, as we noted earlier, to stimulate 
the formation of national parties, as opposed to purely regional or even ethnic ones. Coupled with 
registration requirements that compelled parties to secure signatures beyond the immediate vicinity 
of Moscow, this procedure at first glance it appears to have succeeded in this objective. However, 
even aside from the fact that there were sharp regional differences in the support of the thirteen 
parties that competed in the first Duma elections, the extent to which even this objective was attained 
is subject to dispute. The party loyalty of many Duma deputies elected on party lists is questionable, 
whereas those elected in single-member constituencies have attachments that remain a source 
-
of 
considerable speculation, and some estimates label as many as one fifth of the deputies "independents." 
The desire to see parties consolidate so as to present Russian voters with coherent and non-radical 
alternatives runs afoul of the incentives engendered by national party list PR. Certainly the five 
percent threshold is a disincentive to form a wholly uncompetitive party. But when combined with 
the failure to encourage the election of the president to coordinate factions and future aspirants to 
that office, national PR offers much incentive for the egos that currently cover the Russian landscape 
to use parliamentary elections as a soapbox for furthering their presidential aspirations. 
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If we take all features of the election system into account simultaneously, we see that the 
parliamentary election stage acts much like America's presidential primary elections. It is here that 
presidential aspirants can try to demonstrate or refine the attractiveness of their platforms prior to 
the presidential balloting that follows six month hence. In addition to the rewards from parliamentary 
representation afforded even small parties, the parliamentary stage of voting encourages the 
fragmentation within the party that does not presently control the Presidency that of ten characterizes 
American presidential primaries. However, unlike the American process, there is no stage in Russia, 
except at the very last ballot, whereby presidential aspirants qua parties are eliminated. Instead, a 
majority-with-runoff system merely encourages further the party fragmentation that follows from 
national party-list PR. 
4. Reform
Nothing we have said implies the possibility of a quick fix for Russia's political ailments. Indeed,
there is scant evidence that democratic process can be sustained in a society experiencing massive 
deindustrialization, declining population, declining living standards and declining life expectancy. 
Nevertheless, we should acknowledge the few positive developments in Russian politics. Most 
Russians appear to have been appalled by the sight of tanks firing on the White House, and most 
leaders appear willing, albeit for different reasons, to abide for a time by the restrictions set by the 
new constitution. Separatist sentiment among the subjects of the Federation has muted, at least as 
long as Moscow is unable to exert its will over them and as long as they, in turn, are able to pursue 
their own interests. 
These developments hardly imply the inevitability of democratic stability. Opponents of reform, 
believing that Yeltsin has weakened himself beyond repair by his assault on the old Congress, can 
merely wait for the next round of elections before mounting any new attacks.11 Authorities in the 
Kremlin persist in undermining the development of democratic process at the regional level by 
maintaining their control over regional executive authorities and by replacing city and regional 
governors who oppose their policies.12 And Yeltsin continues to try to fashion a stable order 
through mere hortatory -- through the signing of "Civic Accords" that have no means of enforcement 
11 
12 
See Alexandar Rahr, "Russia's Future: With or Without Yeltsin," RFE/RL Research Report,
3, 17 April 29, 1994, pp, 1-7. 
Julia Wishnevsky, "Problems of Russian Regional Leadership," RFE/RL Research Report, 3, 
19 May 13, 1994, pp. 6- 13. 
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and that fail to address the institutional deficiencies of Russian democracy.13 Nevertheless, none 
of this means that we should resist trying to fashion institutions that move things in the requisite 
direction, even if the outcomes we seek can be realized only with luck and in some "long run." To 
that end, then, we would make three suggestions, all pertaining to Russia's electoral processes, none 
of which require any change in the constitutional order. 
The first change is to abandon any plan to use a majority-with-runoff in the next presidential 
election. Instead, following Costa Rica (whose stability stands out among Latin American states), a 
runoff should occur only if no one receives more than forty percent of the vote. One might object 
to a forty percent threshold with the argument that, although it promises to reduce the number of 
candidates and parties, it also reduces the likelihood that a victorious candidate can claim the thing 
that is most important in a nascent democratic state, a mandate to lead. In fact, precisely the opposite 
is true. The imposition of a fifty percent threshold almost guarantees that no one will surpass this 
hurdle on the first ballot, whereas the majority vote secured by the eventual winner on the second 
ballot is likely to be tainted by the bargains struck between the two ballots. However, by lowering 
the threshold to forty so as to give weak candidates and parties a stronger incentive to refrain from 
running or even forming, we make it more likely that some candidate will secure a majority on the 
first ballot. Thus, once we trace out incentives we see that a mandate to lead is more likely to exist 
if we do not force the system to it. 
The second change concerns the method of electing deputies to the Duma. Here we can off er at 
least two proposals. The first is to allow each federal subject -- each republic, oblast, krai, and 
autonomous region -- to determine the method of election of its own representatives. Abandoning 
proscription and regulation by Moscow in favor of decentralization strengthens Russia's federal 
structure, decreases incentives for party factionalism, and decreases the ability of parties within the 
legislature to claim a mandate that contravenes the president's. 
The disadvantages of this suggestion, at least in the minds of Moscow's power brokers, is that it 
reduces central direction of things and arguably gives "reactionary forces" outside of Moscow greater 
opportunities to control Parliament. But the will of voters in a stable democracy cannot be thwarted 
by blatant manipulations. Nor can a state be federal without a meaningful decentralization of political 
authority. A critical problem with democratic reform thus far is that it has been mostly a "top-down" 
process, with little opportunity for democratic processes to become established at regional and local 
levels. Decentralization of representation and election laws establishes incentives for local political 
13 Vera Tolz, "The Civic Accord: Contributing to Russia's Stability?" REF/ RL Research Report,
3, 19, May 13, 1994, pp. 1-5. 
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elites to learn the rules of democracy and diminishes their incentive to maintain a "guerilla-war" 
relationship with Moscow. · 
An alternative to our suggestion is to move current procedures closer to the German model by 
dividing Russia into, say, ten election districts, and to require that parties submit regional lists of 
candidates. A party's seat allocation in the Duma would continue to depend on its share of the 
national vote, but it would be required to allocate its seats among its lists in accordance with how its 
vote is distributed across regions. This procedure, then, encourages national parties (since it is a 
party's national vote that determines its overall seat allocation), and it encourages decentralization 
within those parties (since parties should seek to field candidates in each region that attractive in that 
region). The disadvantages of this suggestion, though, are that, aside from the disputes that might 
arise over the identities of regions, it leaves in place some of the incentives for party factionalization 
as well as the source of executive-legislative disputes over mandates. Although the incentives for 
party factionalism are attenuated to the extent that it encourages parties to develop regional 
organizations that will support regional lists, legislative claims to a mandate remain viable and likely 
to disrupt executive-legislative relations. And this alternative has little effect on Russia's federal 
structure unless it is somehow accompanied by a decentralization of the administration of elections. 
Innumerable alternatives lie between these two extremes, including allowing PR to operate only 
within each of the ten or so election districts formed under the second alternative or within each 
republic, oblast, and so on. As we move between these extremes we increase or decrease the 
incentives for a decentralized party system, for legislative claims to a national mandate, and for the 
degree of party fractionalization. All of these things need to be weighed in advancing any reform. 
However, regardless of the specifics of the proposal that is deemed more attractive, we should not 
forget that nearly anything is better than the current arrangement, which is nothing short of the 
world's largest experiment with national party-list proportional representation. Two things are certain 
about this experiment. First, it dooms Russia to an muddled party system, with all of the incoherence 
of parliamentary process such a system implies. And second, at least one party within the parliament 
if not the parliament as a whole will claim a mandate in opposition to the president. Finally, we 
should also not forget that Zhirinovsky would have remained an minor and somewhat comical political 
figure had not national party list PR afforded him the opportunity to translate his skill at 
manipulating the media into 60 or so parliamentary seats. 
Party factionalism would be reduced further still if presidential and parliamentary elections are 
held simultaneously. This change contravenes subsection 3 of the new constitution's transitional 
provisions, but such a violation should not cause any great disturbance in the constitutional order. 
More importantly, when combined with our other suggestions, simultaneous elections affords the 
president a better opportunity to do what is uncommon in ex-communist states -- to exert leadership. 
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Leadership, however vague and ill-defined, needs to be distinguished from simple political control. 
Throughout Russian history, those directing the state have relied on the most evident and 
extraordinary instruments of political power rather than on the democratic arts of persuasion, 
compromise, and the power that originates from being seen as the spokesman of the people. The 
lament that Russia is at the mercy of powerful personalities contesting for the reigns of power may 
be accurate. But simultaneity allows an escape from this dangerous equilibrium. Coupled with direct 
election, simultaneity allows a president to bargain away some of his formal authority and to look 
instead to an even more secure basis of power -- the people's mandate. 
We appreciate, of course, that our suggested reforms cannot resolve all of what ails Russian 
democracy. Those ailments are both too complex and too pervasive to yield to any simple, short-term 
corrective. However, unlike mere exhortations to "behave better" or infeasible demands that this or 
that provision of the constitution be changed or abolished, these suggestions are enforceable and can 
be implemented without running afoul of any pre-existing self-interest. But regardless of the steps 
that are ultimately taken, it is imperative that political reform proceed in accordance with the 
principle of self-interest and with the understanding that the implications of reform cannot be 
ascertained without first tracing the incentives it creates of fails to create. 
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